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After years of attempts to reform its sixty-year-old patent law, in September of 2011 the 
United States enacted The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA).  The law ushers in 
substantial changes in U.S. patent law and practice.  Significant among the changes are a number 
of new trial proceedings though which third parties may challenge patents  at U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) once the patent has issued.  The AIA law introduced three new or 
revised post issuance inter partes proceedings: post-grant review, inter partes review, and a 
specialized post-grant review for certain business methods.  These proceedings address rising 
concerns over a perceived proliferation of poor quality patents due to substantial increases in the 
number of patent applications in the U.S.  The primary avenue for testing the validity of patents 
in the U.S. has been litigation, which is both costly and time consuming.  A primary justification 
for the new post issuance proceedings was to provide a faster and less expensive alternative to 
litigation.  Providing an opportunity for third parties to intervene post issuance is not new in the 
U.S. system.  Since 1981, third parties or the patent owner have been able to request an 
examination of an already issued patent through an ex parte  reexamination.  In 1999, the 
American Inventors Protection Act introduced an administrative inter partes reexamination, 
which was not been widely used.  The AIA replaces inter partes reexamination with the inter 
 partes review.  This chapter focuses primarily on post-grant review, the most powerful and 
broadest of the new post issuance proceedings.  
 
Post issuance  review systems have long been debated in U.S.  academic, legal and 
business circles as a way to reduce the incidence of invalid or poor quality patents in a more cost 
efficient manner.  It was natural to turn to the European system as part of the discussion. For 
almost four decades, the European Patent Office (EPO) has heard and decided post grant 
oppositions under the European Patent Convention  (Convention on the Grant of European 
Patents (EPC), 2010).   Empirical studies demonstrate that the more valuable or technologically 
important a patent, the more likely it will trigger an opposition in the EPO, just as it is more 
likely to be litigated in the U.S.    The opposition system has been successful in correcting EPO 
examination errors through invalidating or narrowing patents.   The success of the European 
opposition system has served as a justification for post-grant review in the U.S.  Proponents have 
argued that allowing a patentee’s competitors to intervene post issuance at the PTO will improve 
the quality of patents granted since competitors often have access to critical art not available to 
the examiners.  Society as a whole will also benefit from reducing the number of invalid patents 
earlier and without the costs and delays of patent litigation.   
  The AIA incorporates certain features of the European opposition into the post-grant 
review.  However, substantial differences exist which makes post-grant review in the U.S. a  less 
effective tool for improving the quality of patents.  This chapter begins with part one discussing 
the rationale for the new post-grant review and shortcomings under the pre-AIA system, 
including utilizing the litigation system as the primary vehicle for invalidating patents after grant.  
Part two considers the post grant opposition system operating in Europe followed by a 
 description of the new AIA post grant review system in part three. Part four analyzes whether the 
new American system will fulfill the rationale of a more cost efficient, faster means of ensuring 
patent quality in the United States.  The author concludes that the costs associated with post-
grant review and its potent estoppel rules make it unlikely tool for improving the quality of 
patents or stemming the tide of patent litigation in the U.S.  
 
I. Rationale for Post Issuance Review  
 
The traditional utilitarian justification for patents is providing incentives to invent benefits 
both society and inventors.   In the U.S., the quid pro quo of the patent systems requires 
complete disclosure of the invention in exchange for powerful rights granted to the patentee to 
exclude others from making, using, and selling the patented invention.  The public benefits. Full 
disclosure facilitates further innovation and invention based on the patent and the patented 
invention enters the public domain in twenty years.  The patent owner benefits from the ability 
exploit the patent.  Patents that are invalid or too broad place an unwarranted burden on 
innovation and society.   Uncertainty about the validity of a patent can deter investment and 
impact the direction of innovation (Farrell and Merges, 2004).  Bad quality patents can 
encourage infringement lawsuits and settlements, which raise transaction costs that are passed on 
to consumers (Merrill, Levin and Myers, 2004). Therefore, invalid patents can have a powerful 
negative impact and society benefits by eliminating them.    
Concerns over declining patent quality has been linked to a dramatic increase in the 
number of patent applications filed with and granted by the PTO.   In 1980, 104,329 utility patent 
applications were filed.  The number almost quintupled to 503,582 in 2011.  During the same 
 period, the number of utility patents granted increased from 61,819 to 224,505 (PTO Patent 
Statistics Report, 2012).    A number of factors contribute to the dramatic expansion in 
applications.  In part, it results from an increased interest in acquiring, using and enforcing 
patents domestically as well as  by foreign applicants who wish to exploit their inventions in the 
U.S.   Courts in the U.S. have also expanded patentable subject matter to include those related to 
biotechnology, computer software and business methods.  Patents have grown increasingly 
complex in terms of the number of claims and references to prior art, making examination a 
more arduous task.  All of these factors contribute to an examination backlog. The PTO reported 
more than 1.2 million pending utility patent applications  in its most recent Performance and 
Accountability Report (PTO, 2011).  The sheer number of patent applications, the substantial 
backlog, and increased productivity pressures at the PTO pose serious threats to the quality of 
patents issued. (Thambisetty, 2007; Hall and Harhoff, 2004).  Improving the quality of 
examination so that fewer questionable patents are granted could provide a solution to the patent 
quality conundrum.  However, this would not be desirable as most patents are not valuable.  It 
makes more sense to focus resources on patents likely to have the greatest societal impact in 
terms of both innovation and competitors.   
 
In the U.S., litigation provides the primary avenue for contesting ‘bad’ patents.  Not all 
questionable patents are challenged in court.  Litigation focuses on the most important 
technologically and commercially viable patents (Allison, Lemley and Walker, 2009; Allison, 
Lemley, Moore and Tunkey, 2004; Graham & Harhoff, 2006).  Litigation is a costly vehicle to 
test patents.  The American Intellectual Property Law Association Law Practice Management 
Committee reported the median costs of patent litigation with between one and twenty-five 
 million dollars at risk at $1.5 million through the end of discovery and $2.5 million inclusive of 
all costs (AIPLA, 2011).  Not only is it costly, asymmetries existing in the litigation system 
impact results.   Farrell and Merges explain that patentees have much greater incentives to pursue 
infringement lawsuits or defend vigorously on the issue of patent validity than putative infringers 
have to bring an action (2004).  The press and academic literature are filled with reports on non-
practicing entities, often characterized as trolls, filing infringement lawsuits against numerous 
small competitors and then settling for a licensing fee.  The alleged infringers have little 
economic incentive to challenge the validity of a patent in court. Litigating and losing may be far 
worse than paying the patent owner’s demand for a license, even though the alleged infringer 
may not believe the patent is valid.  Challenging validity in court could bankrupt a small 
company or lead to an injunction that could shut down its business.  Furthermore, if the court 
upholds the patent, the patentee may refuse to license essential technology the infringer needs to 
operate.  A better business alternative for a competitor might be to avoid the lawsuit completely 
or settle the lawsuit by accepting a license from an owner of a questionable patent.  The costs can 
be passed on to the consumer.  The pass through of costs related to questionable patents 
illustrates the public’s stake in lawsuits challenging patents in a way that does not exist in other 
economic lawsuits (Farrell and Merges, 2004).  The ability to settle litigation runs counter to 
society’s interest in ensuring patents are valid.  When a lawsuit related to a questionable patent is 
settled, society may never know whether that patent really was valid.  This can hamper 
innovation and investment.  
For years, scholars, practitioners and government bodies have advocated instituting post 
issuance administrative trial proceedings at the PTO to determine validity more efficiently than 
litigation. (Matal, 2012; Carrier, 2011; Carlson and Migliorina, 2006; Farrell and Merges, 2004; 
 Merrill, et al., 2004; Federal Trade Commission, 2003; McKie and Edward, 1974).    Because of 
the European Patent Office’s history with post grant oppositions, a procedure imbedded in the 
EPC in 1973, many have turned to that model as a rationale for instituting post-grant review in 
the U.S.  Empirical studies demonstrated the efficiencies of oppositions, particularly since the 
most valuable patents granted by the EPO are opposed (Caviggioli, Scellato, and Ughetto, 2012; 
Hall and Harhoff, 2004; Graham, Hall and Harhoff, 2002).  The value of patents determines 
whether those patents are opposed in the EPO, just as the most valuable patents are litigated in 
the U.S.   A number of factors indicate whether a patent will be opposed.  Patents will be 
attacked more frequently if they contain a higher number of backward citations to previous 
patents.  Scellato et al. posit that the positive correlation between a higher incidence of 
oppositions and a larger number of previous patent citations may indicate a more questionable 
inventive step:  that the patent doesn’t meet non-obviousness criteria (2011). The owners of the 
cited patent may more readily become aware of the newly granted patent so can make a decision 
about filing an opposition more quickly than another third party. Forward citations in subsequent 
patents are also relevant to value.  Greater numbers of citations in subsequent inventions indicate 
the patent contributes to the state of the art (Scellato et al., 2011).  The number of claims, which 
can indicate the relative complexity of the patent, is also positively and significantly correlated 
with the likelihood of opposition (Caviggioli et al, 2012).   
 Currently, approximately 5% of all granted European patents are opposed (Boff, 2011; 
Caviggioli et al., 2012).  This indicates a downward trend from a norm of 9.25% between 1980 
and 2000.  Scellato, et al. suggest the decrease might have resulted from improvements in EPO 
examination or greater number of marginal patents not opposed (2011). However, given the 
significant increase in patent applications to the EPO during the same period the PTO has 
 experienced increases, it is probable the more valuable patents opposed may represent a smaller 
percentage of the total number of patents granted by the EPO.  There may also exist a free rider 
problem.  If a patent of questionable quality negatively impacts multiple competitors, individual 
firms may wait for someone else to bear the cost of opposition (Scellato, et al., 2011).  
Oppositions correct a significant number of examination mistakes.  Roughly one third of 
oppositions are rejected with the patents remaining intact as granted.  Approximately one third 
are revoked in their entirety and one third are maintained in amended form that narrow their 
breadth (Boff, 2011; Hall & Harhoff 2004).  Oppositions serve a positive screening function of   
weeding out a substantial number of bad patents and narrowing a substantial number that are too 
broad.  This positive screening function led to advocacy on this side of the Atlantic to include a 
strong post-grant review mechanism in the U.S. patent system.  Indeed, the stated purpose of the 
post-grant review procedure in the AIA is to “establish a more efficient and streamlined patent 
system that will improve patent quality and limit unnecessary litigation costs.”(PTO, Rules of 
Practice, 2012). 
  
II. European Patent System 
 
The EPO houses the largest and most successful system of post issuance inter partes 
review.  The contours of the European opposition provide a good background against which to 
measure the new procedures in the AIA.   The legal landscape for protecting patents within 
Europe is substantially different from that in the U.S.   Rather than a unitary patent application 
and enforcement system that covers the entire territory, Europe has a dual system of 
multinational and national patent law.  What we call a “European” patent is not a single patent 
 covering all of Europe.
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   It is a set of independent national patents created under the EPC using 
a single application through the EPO where it is examined.  A person wishing to patent an 
invention in an EPC contracting state may either file a national application in the patent office 
in each country in which protection is sought, or file one application with the EPO in Munich 
designating all of the contracting states in which they desire protection.  Because all contracting 
states have transposed the EPC into national law, the law should be harmonized such that if a 
person takes the national route a patent is granted in Germany should also be granted in France 
and the U.K.  However, this is not always the case as European nations do not all approach 
patenting in the same manner.  It is possible for one national office to grant a patent and another 
to deny it. National offices subject patent applications to different examination procedures, 
interpretations of the law and requirements and formats for claims.  Even if the patent is granted 
by more than one national office, a patent for the same invention may differ in both form and 
scope from one country to another (Hoyng, 2006).  The resulting lack of consistency makes the 
single EPO application process a more attractive avenue. If the EPO grants the European patent, 
it begins its life with the same form and scope in each European country.   
The European patent does not immediately become a German or Italian patent.  The 
owner must validate or “nationalize” the patent in each of the countries it has designated.  The 
European patent becomes a bundle of national patents governed by national patent law and 
enforced in that country (EPC Art. 64(1); Rudge, 2012).  Once validated in a contracting state, 
the patent is entirely independent of the validated patent in every other contracting state.  
Enforcement and revocation become entirely matters of national law.  Because of differences in 
national law and differing legal traditions, it is possible for a patent granted by the EPO to be 
revoked in one contracting state, but not another (Marsnik & Thomas, 2011).  The primary 
 exception to national sovereignty over a European patent once it has been granted and validated 
is the post grant opposition procedure within the EPO
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.   A number of factors make a third party 
challenge to validity through an opposition more attractive than bringing a revocation 
proceeding in each country.  A primary advantage is consistency.  If the EPO determines a 
patent should not have been granted or narrows the scope of the claims, that decision has 
immediate application in all of the EPC contracting states in which the patent had been 
validated.    If a party is seeking patent protection in a number of European nations, the EPO 
application and opposition system is more efficient than the national route, both in terms of cost 
and uniformity.  
  
A. The EPO Opposition and Appeal 
 
Any third party, except the proprietor of the patent, who believes that the patent should 
not have been granted may file an opposition (EPC, 2010, Art. 99).  The third party need not 
have an interest.  It is possible for a third party to keep his identity secret from the patent owner 
by using a “straw man” to file the opposition on his behalf. (Case G 9/93,1994).  The opposition 
must be filed within nine months of the grant of the patent (EPC, 2010, Art. 99).  If a challenger 
misses the nine month window, the only way to challenge the validly of the patent is through a 
patent revocation procedure under the national laws of the countries in which the patent is 
validated.  Article 100 lists the broad grounds upon which oppositions may be based including 
the “invention” does not meeting patentability criteria, was not sufficiently disclosed or the 
subject matter extends beyond the original application (EPC, 2010).    The EPO’s Opposition 
Division examines the notice to ensure that the opposition is admissible, that it meets the formal 
 requirements for opposition (EPO 2012, Part D).   If so, it proceeds to a panel of three 
experienced technical examiners, one of whom may have been involved in the original 
examination.  If particular legal expertise is required, a legally qualified examiner may be added.   
The opposition is not a reexamination.  It is an inter partes proceeding in which the Opposition 
Division acts in a quasi-judicial role.  However, unlike a court, the Opposition Division is not 
required to limit its determination to the grounds invoked by the parties. On its own motion, the 
Opposition Division may consider other grounds for opposition (EPC, 2010, Rule 8).   
There are four possible outcomes to an opposition:  (1) the opposition may be rejected; 
(2) the patent may be fully revoked as invalid; (3) the patent may be maintained, but in an 
amended form narrows the patent by modifying its claims; or (4) the opposition may be closed 
without an outcome, typically because the opposition is withdrawn or the patent has lapsed for 
failure to pay maintenance fees in all EPC member states in which it has been filed.  Narrowing 
the scope of the patent often takes the form of a negotiation between the parties with the 
Oppositions Division panel serving as mediator (Graham and Harhoff, 2006).  Although 
settlement is possible, once an opposition has been filed, parties’ opportunities are restricted.  
Rule 84(2) of the Implementing Regulations allow the EPO to proceed with the opposition on its 
own motion after the parties have withdrawn (EPC, 2010).  If the Opposition Division has 
reasonable grounds to believe that a limitation or revocation is likely, it will proceed despite the 
absence of the parties. This serves as a powerful deterrent against settlement, since the EPO may 
modify or invalidate the patent without regard to the parties’ settlement agreement and without 
their input.  It also discourages using the opposition strategically to harass a patent holder. 
(Graham and Harhoff, 2006).   Only a small number of opposition cases close without reaching 
 an outcome.  Hall and Harhoff reported the number closing without outcome to be 5.3% and 
most likely capture incidences in which the parties have settled (2004).   
Either party or both may appeal the decision of the Opposition Division to the EPO 
Technical Boards of Appeal (the Board).  There are twenty-seven Boards, each highly 
specialized in a particular subject matter expertise. The particular Board hearing an opposition 
appeal interprets and applies the EPC and case law. One third of oppositions are appealed (Hall 
and Harhoff, 2004).  Filing the appeal prevents the Opposition Division’s decision from entering 
into force until the appeal is resolved (EPC, 2010, Art 109; Veronese, 2009).  This means that a 
patent revoked in opposition remains valid pending the outcome of the appeal.  The Board may 
uphold the decision, modify the decision, or remand the case to the Opposition Division for 
further action.  In most cases, the Board’s decision is final since further appeal of an opposition 
to the Enlarged Board of Appeal is only possible in very limited circumstances such as 
fundamental procedural violations or criminal acts (Veronese, 2009).  Appeal to a court is 
impossible. No multinational court exists for that purpose and a direct appeal is not within the 
jurisdiction of national courts.   
Oppositions can take an excessively long time to complete.  According to the EPO, the 
grant procedure takes about three to five years from the application date.  The average opposition 
takes 2.2 years if the patent is revoked and 4 years if the patent is amended.  Appeals can add 
another two years. (Scellato, et al. 2011). The entire process can average between seven to 
eleven years, although it can last much longer.  The European patent application for the famous 
genetically modified OncoMouse, filed in June of 1985, was initially denied as unpatentable by 
the EPO.  The process of moving through opposition and appeal culminated nineteen years later 
when the Board remitted the matter to the Opposition Division in July of 2004 with directions to 
 enter a modified patent (Harvard/Transgenic animal, 2005).   Ultimately, the patent was revoked 
because the owner didn’t pay the fees.  Although the average case is not as time consuming, the 
OncoMouse example illustrates the impact the process can have on the inventor and on society.  
The longer an opposition takes to reach a conclusion on patentability, the more detrimental the 
impact on the patent holder and competitors.  Uncertainty about the scope of the patent impacts 
the patent owner’s exploitation of the invention.  Competitors may not invest if the possibility of 
their infringing is not clear (Caviggioli, et al., 2012).   
 
B. The Relationship between EPO Oppositions and National Courts 
 
Once the opposition and appeal have concluded finding a patent invalid, the matter has 
ended.  It will be revoked retroactively in each contracting state in which it was validated.   If the 
process finds the patent is valid entirely or in amended form, validity may only be challenged in 
each country individually under that country’s law. The EPC has harmonized grounds for 
revocation in contracting states in Article 139 (EPC, 2010).  The broad grounds for revocation 
track those for invalidity in oppositions, including: the subject matter is not patentable, the 
invention is not sufficiently disclosed, or the subject matter extends beyond the application.  
National court challenges to patent validity may arise as defenses to infringement suits or in 
separate actions to declare the patent invalid (Jacobs, 2012).  Differences in procedural and 
substantive law and the time it takes to resolve a case can lead to very different validity 
outcomes in different countries.  And, how a nation deals with revocation proceedings can 
impact the use of EPO opposition proceedings by its nationals.  The majority of European 
countries handle issues of infringement and validity in the same court (Moss & Jones, 2008; 
 Judge, 2002).  A minority, including Germany, bifurcate issues of infringement and validity.  
German law mandates only the Bunderpatentgericht, the Federal German Patent Court may 
determine validity.  If validity is raised as a defense in a German infringement suit before the 
Bundegerchitshof (BGH), the Federal Court of Justice, the party raising the defense must file a 
separate action for invalidity with the Bunderpaentgericht.  The BGH has no jurisdiction to 
declare the patent invalid.  The Bunderpatentgericht has no jurisdiction to decide infringement.  
Only 25% of parties sued for infringement in BGH cases file separate invalidity actions in only  
25% of all cases (Jacobs, 2012).  The BGH may stay the infringement action pending the 
outcome of the invalidity proceeding, but it is unlikely to do so unless it is obvious that the 
patent is invalid (Marsnik & Thomas, 2012).  This means that if the BGH decides infringement 
before the Bunderpatentgericht determines validity, which is often the case, a defendant is put at 
a commercial disadvantage.  Since he has been found to be infringing, he may not be able to sell 
his products pending the outcome of the invalidation suit.  (Jacobs, 2012) This bifurcation 
feature of the German system may positively impact the number of oppositions filed by 
Germans.  61.2% of all European patents opposed have at least one German opponent, a rate 
nearly six times as high as the next highest opposing country.  Furthermore, 72% of European 
oppositions in which a German is a party are against other Germans.  No other country has such 
a high fraternal opposition rate (Boff, 2012).  The bifurcated German system has an impact.  
  Parties may not have to wait until the conclusion of an existing EPO opposition to challenge 
the validity of a European patent in a national court.  In many countries, a national revocation 
proceeding or trial may run parallel with an EPO opposition.   In countries in which parallel 
proceedings are possible, national courts determine whether their cases will be stayed during the 
pendency of the opposition.   U.K. courts typically will not stay court proceedings unless the 
 opposition is close to a decision (Boff, 2011).  Under German law, a validity action cannot be 
filed with the Bunderpatentgericht as long as an opposition may still be filed or while opposition 
proceedings are pending (Patentgesetz, 2009, §81(2)).   
A determination on an issue by the Opposition Division or Board does not preclude a 
party from raising and arguing the same issues in a national revocation case. The EPC contains 
no estoppel provision (Gupta and Feerst, 2012; Boff, 2011).  The probability of winning a suit in 
a national forum having lost before the Opposition Division and the Board is low.  Graham and 
Harhoff conducted a study of patents surviving European opposition and were later challenged 
before the German Bunderpatentgericht (2006). They found that opposition hardened the patent 
rights.  National courts defer to EPO decisions since judges endeavor to interpret their national 
laws in a manner that doesn’t contradict the EPC and the decisions of the EPO (Scellato, et al., 
2011).  Despite this deference, it is possible for a party to successfully convince a national court 
that a patent granted by the EPO should be revoked, even after it has been validated in 
opposition.  However, the revocation decision of the national court applies only in that country.    
 
C. Costs of EPO Oppositions and National Revocations  
 
It costs less to oppose patents in the EPO than individually challenging the patent in each 
European country in which it has been validated.  The filing fees for oppositions and appeals are 
€ 705 ($915) and € 1180 (1532) respectively.  Total average costs of European oppositions range 
from $15,000 to $50,000 through decision, but can be more if the case is complex or there are 
multiple parties opposing the patent.  The costs of appeal can approach or surpass the cost of the 
opposition (Boff, 2011).  Although each party typically bears the cost of the opposition, unlike 
 the loser pays rule in typical European national litigation, the Opposition Division may order a 
party to pay all costs for “reasons of equity” (EPC, 2010, Art. 104).  The equity provisions apply 
when “the costs are culpably incurred as a result of irresponsible or even malicious actions” 
(EPO, 2012, Part D, IX, 1.4.; Graham & Harhoff, 2002).  This rule has been characterized as an 
anti-troll provision that protects against abuse of the opposition proceeding.    
The cost for nullifying or invalidating a patent at the national level varies. No published 
source exists with this information across jurisdictions.  In most European jurisdictions an 
infringement and revocation action cost between €100,000 ($130,000) and €200,000 ($260,000) 
(Moss & Jones, 2008).  The amount can vary greatly by jurisdiction, particularly since some 
jurisdictions have more liberal discovery and others may regulate lawyers’ fees.  Even a 
relatively straight forward suit in England will cost £500,000 ($812,000) with more complex 
cases costing in excess of £1 million ($1.6 million). Similar amounts can be spent on an appeal.  
In most instances the European opposition is a more attractive option than national 
litigation for reasons of cost, national judicial procedure and for purposes of initially securing a 
uniform patent across European countries.  
 
III.  Post Grant Review Under the America Invents Act 
 
The AIA added multiple options within the PTO that allow third parties to challenge the 
validity of patents post issuance in trial like proceedings. This chapter focuses on post-grant 
review, the proceeding that most closely resembles European opposition.  The new inter partes 
review, a reworking of the previous inter partes reexamination, has no EPC equivalent.  It is a 
narrower proceeding limited to third-party challenges available only after post-grant review and 
 only on novelty and non-obviousness grounds.  It is primarily designed to address issues of prior 
art in patents and printed publications after the post-grant review window has closed.  There is 
also a post grant review for certain business method patents that also has no equivalent under the 
EPC.  Because of its special nature, it is beyond the scope of this chapter.   
Congress added the post-grant review mechanism to the American patent system to provide 
competitors with a faster and less expensive route to testing the validity of newly granted patents 
of dubious validity (Matal, 2012).  The new post issuance proceedings under the AIA are not 
America’s first experiment with third party intervention at the PTO.  More than a decade ago, the 
American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 introduced inter partes reexamination, allowing third 
parties to initiate an administrative alternative to litigation on grounds of novelty and non-
obviousness based on prior art consisting of patent or printed publications (Patent Act of 1952, 
§303(a)).   The inter partes reexamination was rarely used and is no longer available.  According 
to the most current published data, only 1659 inter partes reexaminations have been filed in total 
(PTO, Inter Partes Reexamination Filing Data, 2012).  It did not fulfill its potential of providing 
an effective, low cost alternative to litigation. In large part, its estoppel provisions prevented 
wide use.   In a civil action following the inter partes reexamination, the person requesting the 
reexamination was estopped from asserting the invalidity of any claim found to be valid on any 
grounds it “raised or could have raised” during the reexamination” (Patent Act of 1952,§315(c)).  
The broad consensus among patent experts indicated the estoppel risk to a challenger was too 
great (Farrell and Merges). Similar, although less restrictive, estoppel provisions in both inter 
partes review, which replaces inter partes reexamination, and post-grant review could have a 
similar impact.  
 
 A. Post Grant Review 
The AIA post-grant review resembles European opposition in a number of key features 
and differs in significant ways.  Post-grant review and oppositions are similar in terms of who 
may file, the time frame for filing, and the relationship of validity grounds in the administrative 
trial to those used in civil cases.  Under §321 of the AIA, any person who is not the owner of the 
patent may file a petition to institute a post-grant review no later than nine months after the date 
of the patent grant or issuance of a reissue patent (Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 2011, 
§321). Similar to the European opposition, patentability may be challenged on broad grounds.  
Under the AIA, these include novelty, non-obviousness, abandonment, failure to comply with 
requirements for the specification. (Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 2011, § 321).  The 
Director reviews the petition and may not authorize the review unless the petition presents 
information, which if not rebutted, demonstrates “that it is more likely than not at least 1 of the 
claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable” or that is raises “novel or unsettled legal 
question” important to other patents or applications. (Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 2011, § 
324).  This threshold essentially requires the petitioner to present a prima facia case. Its practical 
effect  requires petitioners to closely tie its challenges to particular arguments against particular 
claims (Matal, 2012).  Thus, the AIA incorporates a higher initial threshold showing than is 
required in the EPO.  The grounds for determining a European opposition inadmissible are 
primarily based on technical non-compliance with filing rules, not a threshold showing of 
invalidity.  The post-grant review will be heard by a newly created Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board (PTAB) sitting in panels of three administrative judges having both legal and technical 
competence.  The composition of the PTAB differs from the typical panel of three technical 
experts on the Opposition Division panels.  Their functions differ, as well.  Opposition Division 
 panels function in a quasi-judicial capacity while the PTAB’s function is judicial. A critical 
difference between the European opposition and the post-grant review is the duration of the 
proceeding.  The AIA mandates that the PTAB must issue its final determination one year from 
the PTO’s notice of proceeding, although the decision may be delayed for up to six months for 
good cause (Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 2011,§326).  The EPC has no such time limit.  
As with European oppositions, there are four possible outcomes of the post-grant review.  
The PTAB must issue a written decision and: (1) publish a new certificate cancelling any claim 
determined to be unpatentable, (2) publish a certificate confirming any claim determined to be 
patentable, (3) publish a certificate incorporating new or amended claims determined to be 
patentable, or (4) terminate the post-grant review (Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 2011, 
§328(b)).  Section 327 mandates that the post-grant review be terminated with respect to any 
petitioner upon a joint request by the petitioner and patent owner upon submission of a 
settlement agreement, unless the post-grant review has been decided prior to the filing of the 
termination (Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 2011).  However, the PTAB retains discretion to 
terminate the review or continue reviewing a challenged patent even if no petitioner remains in 
the post-grant review (Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 2011, §327(a); PTO, Rules of Practice, 
2012, §42.74(a)). The PTO takes the view that the issue of patentability is not subject to 
settlement and will consider the facts of each case in determining whether to proceed to written 
decision.  The final rules provide that the PTAB may independently determine any question of 
patentability.  (PTO, Rules of Practice, 2012, §42.74(a)).  This discretion to continue deciding 
patentability without the parties may prove to be as powerful a deterrent against settlement as 
Rule 84(2) of the EPO’s Implementing Regulations.  However, post-grant review petitioners 
have incentives to settle under Section 327 that do not exist in the European opposition.  If a 
 petitioner settles under Section 327 and the post-grant review is terminated and no estoppel 
attaches to the petitioner, its real party in interest or privy.  Because estoppel is not an issue in 
EPO oppositions, the same incentive to settle does not exist.  For this reason, a petitioner under 
the AIA may prefer to settle a post-grant review, rather than proceed to a final written 
determination.  Either party may appeal the PTAB judgment directly to the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit (CAFC) (Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 2011, §141).  
 
B. Relationship of Post Grant Review and Other Proceedings 
 
 The AIA includes rules governing the relationship between post-grant review and other 
proceedings.  The estoppel provisions are among the more controversial due to their broad scope 
and how early they attach.   
 Parties who have a final written decision from the PTAB may not assert in a subsequent 
PTO proceeding, such as an inter partes review, or in a civil action, whether it be Federal Court 
or an action before the International Trade Commission, any grounds for invalidity that the 
petitioner “raised or reasonably could have raised during that post-grant review” (Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act, 2011, § 325(e)).  The “reasonably could have raised” estoppel provision is 
troublesome.  The language was meant to soften the estoppel provisions of inter partes 
reexamination, which precluded a party raising an issue it “could have raised” in reexamination 
in subsequent litigation.  Matal, in his legislative history of the AIA, quotes Senator Kyle’s 
explanation for adding the modifier “reasonably” was meant to “ensure that the could-have-
raised estoppel extends only to that prior art which a skilled searched conducting a diligent 
search reasonably could have been expected to discover” (2012).    The “reasonably could have 
 raised” standard was added to the new inter partes review, replacing inter partes reexamination 
(Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 2011, § 314(e)).  It was meant to prevent duplicative 
administrative and judicial proceedings.  The standard was never meant to apply across the board 
to all proceedings subsequent to post-grant review.   Earlier versions of patent reform bills 
limited post-grant review estoppel in subsequent civil cases only to issues actually raised and 
decided.    Business and patent law professional associations supported the limitation in 
subsequent litigation, fearing that if the estoppel effects of post-grant review were too harsh, it 
would not be used.  In all versions of the bill, except the final version, the “reasonably could 
have raised standard” for post-grant review only applied to subsequent administrative 
proceedings such as inter partes review.  However, in the final version of the bill the “reasonably 
could have raised” standard applied to civil litigation, as well.  Since nothing in the record 
acknowledged this change, it appears to be an error made in the final version (Matal, 2012).   
Post-grant review estoppel relating to civil actions attaches early. Section 325(e)(2) 
provides that a post grant review that results in a final written decision precludes a petitioner, 
real party in interest or privy from raises invalidity grounds raised or reasonably could have 
raised.  This language indicates estoppel attaches upon the written decision, not after the appeals 
have been exhausted. Given that post-grant review determinations must be made within twelve 
or eighteen months, estoppel may have a fairly imminent impact. It is unclear how the CAFC 
will interpret the estoppel language. In a recent case, the CFAC held that the estoppel effect of an 
inter partes reexamination required all appeals be exhausted before estoppel attached (Bettcher 
v. Bunzl, 2011), which could take six years. (McKeown, 2011).  It is possible the CAFC could 
interpret the post-grant review language in a similar manner.    
 The AIA contains rules governing the relationship between post-grant reviews and civil 
actions.  A post-grant review may not be instituted if a petitioner has previously filed a 
declaratory judgment for invalidity.  However, that party may file a petition for a post-grant 
review challenging the validity of one or more claims any time after filing a declaratory 
judgment action.  Filing the post-grant review triggers an automatic stay of the court action.  The 
stay may not be lifted until the patent owner moves the court to lift the stay, the patent owner 
files an action or counterclaim for infringement, or the post-grant review petitioner moves the 
court to dismiss the claim (Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 2011, § 325(a)).  Given the post-
grant review estoppel provisions, the PTAB will make the final determination on patentability of 
a particular claim.  Post-grant review proceedings may only coexist with litigation if the patent 
owner has filed a claim or counterclaim for infringement.  If the patent owner files a preliminary 
injunction action alleging infringement within three months of the patent grant, the court may not 
stay the action on the grounds that the petitioner has filed a post grant review (Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act, 2011, § 325(b)).    Therefore, if a post-grant review is progressing parallel 
to a court action under circumstance allow by the AIA, a ruling by the PTAB on patentability 
will estop the court from determining validity.  A ruling by the trial court does not have the same 
effect on proceedings before the PTAB.   
 
C. Costs of Post-Grant Review and Other Procedural Issues 
 
A key reason for incorporating third-party post grant  proceedings in the America Invents 
Act was to provide a more cost effective alternative to  litigation.  On August 14, 2012, the PTO 
published its final rules, including  fees and estimated the costs of a post-grant review.  The 
 filing fee, which must be submitted with the post-grant review petition, depends upon the 
number of claims (PTO, Changes to Implement, 2012, § 42.203).  The basic fee of $35,800 
applies to petitions challenging up to twenty claims with $800 added for each additional claim 
(PTO, Rules of Practice, 2012, § 42,15(b)).   Therefore, if sixty claims are contested, the filing 
fee totals $67,800.   Although these fees are lower than the escalating fees originally proposed in 
February 2012, they are exponentially higher than the €705 ($915) fixed filing fee for an EPO 
opposition.  Several comments made during rulemaking suggested setting a low filing fee with 
no additional fees for additional claims (PTO, Rules of Practice, 2012).  The fees remain 
substantial because AIA does not provide for setting post-grant review fees at below the cost to 
the PTO (Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 2011, §321(a).   
Attorney fees for a post-grant review dwarf the filing fee.  The PTO estimated the cost of 
a post-grant review based on the AIPLA mean private firm attorney fee of $371per hour and the 
number of hours to prepare for various stages in the proceedings (PTO, Rules of Practice).  
Based on these figures, the PTO calculates the attorney fees to prepare a petition at $61,333.  The 
patent holder is allowed to make a preliminary response prior to the PTO threshold 
determination, estimated to cost $34.000.  Once the PTO has made a determination that the 
petition meets the statutory requirements, the patent owner may reply and a third party may make 
a statement, estimated at $29,000 each.  The PTO projects the average post-grant review will 
include 8 motions, oppositions and replies at an average cost of $44,200 each, including the cost 
of experts and preparing briefs (PTO, Rules of Practice, 2012). Until 2017, an Information 
Technology fee of $1750 for up to twenty claims and $75 for each additional claim will also be 
assessed.  Based on these estimates, a petitioner will spend nearly half a million dollars for a 
petition contesting twenty or fewer claims. The patent owner  faces similar expenditures, less the 
 filing fee, but may have to face a subsequent inter partes review or potential litigation by a 
person not the petitioner or one of its real parties in interest or privies.  
  The proposed rules set a maximum of eighty pages for post-grant review petitions in 14-
point type or larger and double spaced regardless of the number of claims challenged or the 
complexity of issues presented.  The petition must identify all real parties in interest and certify 
that the petitioner is not estopped from proceeding.  It must identify all claims challenged, the 
grounds upon which the challenge to each claim is based, provide claim construction and show 
how the construed claim is unpatentable based on the grounds alleged.  The petition may include 
a statement of material facts.  The table of contents, table of authorities, and certificate of service 
and appendix of exhibits are not included in the page count. The page limit may be waived by 
motion, but the petitioner must show that doing so would be in the interests of justice and must 
append a copy of the proposed petition exceeding the page limit (PTO, Rules of Practice, 2012 § 
42.24).  Given the growth in the number of patent claims and the complexities of technology, the 
page limits may not be sufficient to fully address the post-grant review threshold requirement of 
“more likely than not at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.”  In order 
to meet the page limit restrictions, it may be necessary for petitioners to file multiple petitions 
focusing on different claims, and pay the minimum filing fee each time.  This will increase costs 
to petitioners and decrease efficiency. 
 
IV.  Post Grant Review Will Not Improve the Quality of Patents 
 
It is unlikely the AIA post-grant review system will accomplish the social welfare 
benefits of improving patent quality and providing an efficient alternative to litigation.    This 
 section delimits some of the flaws in post-grant review that will hamper its effectiveness. No 
post grant system for opposing patents will be successful unless it is used.  Factors such as cost, 
page limits of the petitions and the harsh estoppel provisions may make it an unattractive 
alternative to third parties who might otherwise benefit from a finding of invalidity.    
 
A. Factors Limiting the Effectiveness of Post-Grant Review 
 
Only patents issued under the new AIA first-inventor-to-file (FITF) system are eligible 
for post-grant review.  Given the FITF doesn’t go into effect March 16, 2013 and petitioners will 
likely take the nine months allowed to prepare their petitions, it will be some time until the 
effectiveness of post-grant review is known.  However, it is not likely to be effective.  The 
United States does not have a history and tradition of trial like inter partes post issuance review. 
Given proper incentives, U.S.-based third parties would use the systems, but the AIA does not 
include the proper incentives.  Americans are the second most likely nationality to oppose 
European patents after the Germans, accounting for approximately 11.5% of European 
oppositions (Boff, 2012). Many of the incentives for utilizing European oppositions are the same 
for Americans as for others using the system.  European oppositions are relatively inexpensive 
and preferable to national revocation proceedings, particularly in Germany.  Despite the 
efficiencies of the European system, only about 5% of all patents are opposed.   Based on 
statistics for granted utility patents in 2011, if the PTO were faced with post-grant review filings 
at the EPO rate, it would be flooded with over 25,000 filings.  The AIA empowers the PTO to 
limit the number of inter partes reviews and post-grant reviews during the AIA’s first four years. 
The PTO does not expect to limit the number of petitions granted.  However, if the PTO rejects a 
 substantial number of inter partes review petitions on these grounds, after the petitioner has 
incurred the expense of filing,  whether a third party chooses the non-litigation route may be 
impacted.   Too many rejections  may undermine confidence during the early years of the system 
when a tradition of using post-issuance reviews should be built.  
When post issuance administrative review is too expensive, the incentives for potential 
challengers to use it diminish. Graham and Harhoff calculate that when the cost of a post grant 
review reaches $500,000, the welfare benefits are eroded (2006).   As demonstrated, the cost of 
pursuing a post-grant review can approach that amount, even when twenty or fewer claims are 
contested.  The costs escalate when there are a large number of claims involved or when multiple 
post-grant reviews must be filed to cover a substantial number of challenges within the 
administrative page limit requirements.  Fewer competitors will likely use a very expensive 
system, which will negatively impact the usefulness of the system to catch and correct weak or 
invalid patents.   
The cost may particularly deter individuals and small to medium sized companies.  Just 
paying the filing fee and filing the petition for the post-grant review is projected to cost more 
than the average cost of the entire European opposition.  The difference between a €705 filing 
fee (approximately $915) and one that begins at $35,800 and escalates in increments of $800 per 
claim is immense. The EPO’s lower fee encourages use of the system and shields independent 
inventors and small and medium sized enterprises from strategic abuse of the system (Hall and 
Harhoff, 2004).  The AIA contains no such protection for small to medium sized entities.  
Moreover, it is unlikely to be used by smaller entities subject to infringement litigation. Under 
litigation threat by non-practicing entities, often described as trolls, most companies settle to 
avoid expensive litigation and the potential of a permanent injunction that could destroy their 
 business (Thomas, 2006). Trolling activities are unlikely to decrease even though post-grant 
opposition in the U.S. has been touted as a way to limit them (Mayergoyz, 2009).  If a non-
practicing patentee sues, post-grant review is a viable alternative only if the lawsuit is filed early 
in patent’s life.  If sued after the nine month post-grant review window, the small entity may 
resort to an inter partes review on narrower grounds and based only on published prior art. The 
inter partes  review is subject to some of the same negative features as the post-grant review 
including estoppel and high and escalating fees, although set thirty-three percent lower than 
those for post-grant review due to more limited grounds.  McKeown has pointed out, the 
economics of the “troll game” make the proposed AIA fee structure an unworkable alternative 
(2012(a)).  Non-practicing entities will typically dismiss a party from a law suit for a licensing 
fee of $100,000 to $300,000 (McKeown, 2012(a)). Given the cost of a post-grant review, it may 
be more economically feasible and less risky for a small entity to settle the lawsuit without 
resorting to post-grant or inter partes review.  
The estoppel provisions may serve as the most effective barrier to the success of 
American post-grant review.  These provisions are likely to plague post-grant review in the same 
way estoppel precluded inter partes reexamination.  The broad consensus among patent experts 
and the PTO recognized that estoppel was the most frequently identified issue for deterring third 
parties from filing requests for inter partes reexamination (Carlson & Migliorini, 2006; Farrell 
and Merges, 2004).  A third party could file a request for inter partes reexamination at any time 
((Patent Act of 1952, § 311(a)).  This provided ample time for those willing to brave the estoppel 
provisions to determine which novelty or non-obviousness attacks had the most merit and to 
brief them without page limit restrictions.  In contrast, a petitioner for post-grant review has only 
nine months to determine whether a post-grant review is feasible and present all the grounds it 
 wishes to preserve against particular claims in a petition limited to eighty pages.  The nine month 
post-grant review window may prove particularly burdensome in industries such as 
pharmaceuticals or medical devices requiring clinical trials and for those selling products with 
thousands of component parts containing patents, such as the computer or cell phone industry 
(Carrier, 2011). It may not be possible to discover a potentially invalid patent and to file a review 
on all possible grounds within nine months. Given the time frame, it may not be desirable.    
Estoppel in a post-grant review  attaches upon a written decision of the PTAB, twelve to 
eighteen months from the date the proceeding was initiated because of the statutory requirement 
it must be completed during that time period.  The twelve months mandated under the AIA to 
reach a decision is about one third the average 36.1 month pendency of an inter partes 
reexamination (PTO, Inter Partes Reexamination Filing Data, 2012).  Challengers may not trust 
the PTAB to correctly rule in a post-grant review given how quickly the determination must be 
made. Even though the outcome of the post-grant review may be appealed to the CAFC, it is as 
yet unclear whether estoppel will attach upon a PTAB judgment or after the appeal.  
Furthermore, the challenger forever loses its opportunity to have the issue fully adjudicated on 
different later discovered grounds or evidence, if those grounds were raised or reasonably could 
have been raised during the post-grant review.  
Post-grant review’s broad “reasonably could have raised” standard was never meant to 
apply to civil litigation.  Given the broadness of the estoppel provision, how quickly a party must 
determine whether to oppose a grated patent and the speed at which the PTAB must reach its 
final conclusion, a third party is unlikely to use risk a post-grant review.  It must be remembered 
that the EPC contains no estoppel provisions preventing further litigation on the same issues 
decided by the EPO.  Although national courts may defer to EPO decisions, the lack of estoppel 
 provides a check on the accuracy of the European opposition system by national courts. No 
evidence exists that this practice has exposed patentees to multiple challenges. More importantly, 
it has allowed the national courts to serve the interests of the public by subjecting patents to an 
additional level of scrutiny.  Limiting estoppel in litigation circumstances in the United States to 
grounds actually raised in a post-grant review would make the procedure more palatable to 
potential users. It would also better serve society in offering additional avenues to test patents.     
A post grant review system allowing for easy settlement erodes the very purpose of a 
system designed to improve patents.  Prior to joining the EPC, the U.K. patent law included both 
pre-grant and post-grant opposition procedures with no barriers to settlement.  75% of all U.K. 
oppositions ended in settlement, which did not preclude U.K. courts from later revoking the 
opposed patents  (McKie, 1974).  As McKie observed forty years ago, competitors oppose 
patents to protect their interests, not the public’s interest. If a third party can reach the result he 
wishes through a negotiated licenses,  that will be the likely path, rather than an expensive 
opposition (1974).  The AIA mandates terminating the proceeding as to any petitioner upon joint 
request of the petitioner and the patent owner unless the PTAB has decided on the merits.  Such 
a termination means that no estoppel attaches to that petitioner, its real party in interest or its 
privy.  Although the AIA grants the PTAB discretionary power to terminate the review or 
proceed to a final written decision, the contours of that discretion are yet to be tested.  The PTO 
has indicated its decision to terminate the review or to proceed to a final written decision 
depends on the particular facts (PTO, Rules of Practice, 2012). How the PTAB approaches those 
facts and makes its determination will determine whether the AIA settlement provisions open the 
system to misuse.  If too lenient in continuing to final written decision without the petitioners, a 
competitor could file a post-grant review to force a patentee into negotiating a license, or risk 
 invalidation or narrowing of claims.  Settling the post-grant review in exchange for the license 
may make it a more commercially viable option.  Liberally allowing for settlement without the 
threat of a final PTO determination on patentability would mean neither the parties nor society at 
large would ever know whether the challenged patent truly was valid.  An opposition system 
discouraging settlement more effectively supports the goal of improving the quality of patents.  
The EPO’s procedures allowing the Opposition Division to continue after the parties have 
withdrawn have acted as a “powerful deterrent” to settlement (Hall & Harhoff, 2004). Unless the 
AIA systemic barriers  to hinder settlements are enforced it is unlikely the public will benefit 
from a post-grant review.  Therefore, the PTAB should exercise its discretion to determine 
patentability whenever possible.     
 
B. Post Grant Review in National Systems 
 
Administrative post-grant review may be more appropriate and effective in multinational 
patent systems.  Few countries maintain post-grant time limited administrative review systems.  
Only thirty percent of EPC contracting states have post grant oppositions as part of their national 
systems (European Patent Academy, 2010).  It is not surprising that Germany, whose nationals 
file the majority of European oppositions, includes an opposition for patents filed nationally. 
German law requires filing national oppositions within three months of the grant, making its 
general usefulness questionable.  Before acceding to the EPC, the U.K. had two oppositions 
systems, one that allowed third party intervention prior to issuance and the other allowing for 
opposition within one year of the grant.  The system was used in only about 1% of cases and was 
often used for delaying tactics or to harass patentees (McKie, 1974).  Neither form of national 
 opposition made it into the UK Patents Act 1977, enacted to transpose the EPC requirements into 
U.K. law (1977).   
More recently, Japan abolished its time limited post grant opposition system in favor of a 
single, non-time limited patent invalidation trial within the Japanese Patent Office (Carlson and 
Migliorina, 2006).    In 1996, Japan implemented a post grant opposition system to replace a pre-
grant opposition system, which had been misused and delayed the grant of patents.  In 2003, only 
seven years after introducing the system, Japan abolished its post-grant oppositions. It found a 
dual system of opposition and a separate trial system for invalidation burdened patentees who 
were subjected to repeated attacks against the same patent (Sun, 2004; Tessensohn and 
Yamamoto, 2003).  The current system provides for an invalidation trial within the Japanese 
Patent Office as the sole mechanism to invalidate patents issued or filed after 2004.  The parties 
may appeal through the court system.  Nothing in the law estops a challenger from filing 
subsequent requests for a new invalidity trial based on different grounds (Carlson & Migliorina, 
2006).   
Evidence from these examples indicates that when post grant oppositions coexist with 
other avenues for invalidation on a national level, opportunities to misuse the system occur.   The 
America Invents Act provides what has been characterized as an “arsenal” of proceedings to 
weed out low-quality patents (Tran, 2012). Besides litigation and post-grant review, procedures 
include supplemental examination, ex parte reexamination, inter parties review, and a separate 
post grant review for business methods relating to financial services and products.  These routes 
to reexamination and reconsideration overlap, making the U.S. system much more complex than 
other national or multinational systems by the sheer number of avenues available for challenging 
patents in addition to litigation.  These multiple avenues for invalidation raises the potential of 
 undue harassment of patentees and duplicates patent office resources in administration of parallel 
systems (Carlson and Migliorina, 2006). Some of the abuses experienced in other nations’ 
systems may be ameliorated in the U.S. system by the high cost of the procedure and the post-
grant review estoppel provisions.  However, those are two of the very provisions that may ensure 
the procedure is not used.   
The landscape is different in the multinational European system.  Without a post grant 
oppositions and appeals procedure in the EPO, invalidation of patents in Europe would be 
piecemeal and lead to differing results in different nations.  A central procedure for oppositions 
at the EPO lowers costs and enhances predictability, since the invalidation or narrowing of the 
patent has immediate effect in all EPC national jurisdictions.  The structure of national 
infringement and invalidation proceedings makes the European opposition more appealing to 
some nationals than others.  Germans have a long history of using their national opposition 
system prior to joining the EPC (McKie, 1974).  Oppositions are often used as a way to narrow 
patents.  Structural reasons exist for a German propensity to use oppositions as a primary route to 
challenging the validity of patents.  Within a national system in which infringement and 
invalidation are bifurcated into two separate courts – courts that can and do reach decisions on 
infringement and validity at different times – European opposition proves to be a less risky route 
to invalidation.  
Conclusion 
Post-grant review under The America Invents Act will not improve the quality of patents 
in the U.S.  Although it has been characterized as the most powerful tool in an arsenal of new 
post-grant administrative proceedings (Tran, 2012), it is unlikely to be a useful tool without 
substantial changes to the law.  Following the example of the European opposition, the fee 
 structure must be modified to make the cost of filing and perusing post-grant review a feasible 
option.  This is particularly important in order to shield independent inventors and small and 
medium sized enterprises from strategic misuse of the system.  This cannot be accomplished 
without modification of §321(a) requiring the PTO to consider the aggregate costs of the post-
grant review in setting fees.  Estoppel is not a feature of European opposition law.  No evidence 
suggests that a lack of estoppel has led to strategic abuse by parties between the multinational 
and national systems.  Furthermore, it serves the public interest of assuring patents administered 
at the national level are valid.   Estoppel poses similar and different issue in the U.S. national 
system in which a party may bring other administrative proceedings or civil actions.  Patentees 
should be protected from harassment by third parties misusing the system. However, the public’s 
interest in valid patents should outweigh that interest given the purpose of the patent system to 
advance the useful arts.  Preventing the rehearing of issues actually decided by the PTAB in 
post-grant reviews could more equitably accomplish this goal. Legislative history indicates that 
Congress never intended “reasonably could have raised” estoppel to prevent subsequent 
litigation on patent validity.  As predicted, this provision will serve as a significant obstacle to 
post-grant review’s usefulness. At a minimum, it is imperative Congress act to correct this 
mistake.  
Uncertainty in the AIA settlement and termination provisions has the potential to 
undermine the purpose of post-grant review to insure the quality of patents.  Given the PTO’s 
discretion to continue to final written decision without petitioners indicates the AIA may contain 
the same powerful deterrent to settlement that exists in the EPC. Without this safeguard, if a 
substantial number of post-grant reviews terminate in settlement without a PTO decision on 
patentability, the public’s interest in the quality of patents would be  compromised. 
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1
       The EPC is not a convention of the European Union (EU).  Despite efforts to join the EPC, the EU is not a 
party, although each of the 27 EU Member States are among the 40 European nations that are Contracting States to 
the EPC. 
2
     A second exception exists.  EPC 2000 introduced a new proceeding allowing patent owner to limit claims in a 
granted patent under Article 105(a).  Under this procedure, a patent can be narrowed or revoked and the result will 
apply retroactively in each of the countries in which the patent has been validated. (Rudge, 2012).  
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